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Abstract: Index insurance has a huge potential to increase the income of households 
in developing countries by shielding them against various shocks and by facilitating 
technology adoption. Despite this theoretical promise, however, the uptake of 
insurance has turned out to be disappointingly low. One of the key barriers in the 
adoption of this financial technology has been learning difficulty. Index insurance 
can be considered a relatively complex product especially in the context of low 
financial literacy in developing countries. Despite the relevance of learning in the 
diffusion of the product, however, previous studies on the subject have been quite 
limited.  This study attempts to address this gap by testing the effect of two learning 
methods, a 9min video and a computer-simulated insurance game. The study relies 
on experimental data from Samburu County of Kenya on the adoption of IBLI (Index-
Based Index Livestock Insurance) that insures against drought for pastoral 
households. The two training methods, or treatments, are tested on 1743 
households. The main finding of the study is that both types of interventions could 
enhance the uptake of index insurance. The insurance game increases the uptake of 
index insurance provided that it is framed as insurance for household rather than 
for livestock. The effect is a 3-4 percentage point (pp) increase in uptake and only 
appears for sales windows right after the treatment. The video intervention has 
opposite effects depending on the gender of the treated household head. For male-
headed households, the effect is a 2-3 pp increase in uptake while for females, it is 
about a 6 pp decrease in uptake. In general, the results suggest that the insurance 











Risk is a key poverty trap in developing countries. A significant number of 
smallholder farmers in developing countries, over 60 percent in some cases, face at 
least one type of shock in the form of extreme weather, pests, and volatile price, etc. 
(World Bank, 2013). To cope with these shocks, farmers often employ inefficient ex-
ante and ex-post risk management strategies (Awel & Azomahou, 2014). Their ex-
ante risk management strategies usually confine them to low-risk low-return 
investments effectively incurring high-risk premiums. And once a shock occurs, the 
farmers often have to sell their productive assets further tightening the grip of 
poverty. The effective risk premium of these traditional risk mitigation strategies of 
farmers could be as high as 35 % of annual production (Rosenzweig & Binswanger, 
1993). 
 
Index insurance has been introduced in an agrarian setting as a substitute for formal 
insurance. As of today, more than 10 million farmers are using the service (Greatrex 
et al., 2015). Index insurance has been effective in addressing the challenges of 
implementing formal insurance in smallholder settings in the developing world due 
to difficulties in acquiring necessary actuarial data, managing moral hazards, and 
confirming claims (Jensen, Mude, & Barrett, 2018). Index insurance employs weather 
or other objectively verifiable indices for which neither the insurer nor the client has 
exclusive access, thereby minimizing the risks of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
In relative terms, the actuarial data for index insurance are also easily available as it 
relies on weather and other aggregate level measures. 
 
To the disappointment of many, however, the uptake of index-based insurance has 
been below expectations, where uptake as low as 0.5 % has been reported (Ahmed, 
McIntosh, & Sarris, 2020; Carter, de Janvry, Sadoulet, & Sarris, 2017; Jensen et al., 
2018). The sustainable adoption of index insurance often entailed heavy subsidies 
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(Carter et al., 2017) and at times remained low despite subsidies (Cai & Song, 2017).  
Reasons for the low uptake have been attributed to several factors, including basis 
risk, high price elasticity of demand, liquidity constraints, and learning difficulties. 
Two of these factors, however, could be considered peculiar to index insurance. The 
first is basis risk. Basis risk is the probability that indemnity payment from index 
insurance is not triggered while a farmer actually incurs a substantial loss in income. 
Several studies have shown that the miscorrelation between indices and actual loss 
is quite substantial (Clarke, Mahul, Rao, & Verma, 2012), and could explain the low 
demand for index insurance (Jensen et al., 2018; Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto, & Udry, 
2014). 
 
Along with basis risk, the learning difficulty could be considered one of the most 
important challenges in the diffusion of index insurance. Index insurance is not just a 
new product in the ranks of microcredit or new seeds for rural farming and pastoral 
communities. Unlike prior innovations introduced in the developing world, farmers 
need to take several years to experience what an insurance product can actually 
provide. In other words, learning about index insurance requires learning a new 
probability distribution of gains and losses (Carter et al., 2017) that may demand 
real-world experience over many years than required by most technologies.  
 
The extensive literature in technology adoption in developing countries has 
particularly emphasized learning for relatively complex technologies. Learning can be 
defined “as taking place when new information affects behavior and results in 
outcomes for an individual that are closer to the (private) optimum” (Foster & 
Rosenzweig, 2010). Therefore, acquiring and processing new information is at the 
core of the learning process. For relatively simple technologies, this could be quite 
straightforward. For example, learning about a new fertilizer may only involve 
explaining the link between the yield and nutrient needs of plants. However, for 
technologies like index insurance, the learning process often entails having a good 
grasp of how the probability distribution of income changes in the presence of 
insurance. As a result, relatively complex technologies are often strongly associated 
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with a higher level of schooling whereas the role of experience is diminished (Foster 
& Rosenzweig, 2010).  
 
Learning about index insurance may involve two formats: description-based and 
experience-based. The description-based choice takes place when index insurance is 
presented by describing how it reduces risk and how it changes the probabilities of 
losses and gains. This is similar to the choice format extensively studied by Tversky 
and Kahneman in prospect theory (Harbaugh, Krause, & Vesterlund, 2010).  
The fourfold pattern from prospect theory contains some key insights that could be 
useful in thinking about the learning process for index insurance. According to this 
theory, people are risk-seeking for small probabilities of gains while being risk-averse 
for small probabilities of losses. This is attributed to the overweighting of small 
probabilities. The pattern is reversed for medium and large probabilities. In the latter 
case, people tend to be risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses. Assuming 
the probability of gain from index insurance falls within the medium and large 
probability range, the descriptive format may indicate risk-aversion in adopting the 
insurance.  
 
A relatively less-researched decision format is experience-based (feedback-based) 
choice. In this decision format, individuals make decisions based on a learning 
process that provides feedback to their proposed decisions.  Examples of 
experience-based learning mechanisms may include role-playing and simulated 
computer games. Rakow and Newell (2010) extensive review of experience-based 
choices showed that in general for low probability choices, this decision format 
shows an opposite pattern to the predictions of prospect theory. Thus, for small 
probabilities of gains, individuals are risk-averse while being risk-seeking for small 
probabilities of losses. For medium and large probabilities, however, the empirical 
literature is still scant and inconclusive. The experience-based approach has gained 
more attention particularly with the rise of gamification. Gamification can be defined 
as the use of game design elements in non-game contexts (Deterding, Khaled, Nacke, 
& Dixon, 2011). Gamification allows a more realistic learning but its advantage over 
traditional methods is not still well established 
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There is a growing yet limited literature on the best ways of training potential clients 
for index insurance. These studies use both description- and experience-based 
techniques ranging from a short promotional video to computer-simulated insurance 
games. Their findings are often inconsistent showing positive to no relationship 
between training and insurance uptake.  Cai and Song (2017) examined how 
insurance games and simple probability information influence insurance (for 
disaster) uptake in China. In the insurance game, participants decide whether to 
insure themselves or not in each of the ten rounds. In each of these rounds, a lottery 
system reveals whether there are disasters or not in each round and the associated 
income levels.   Cai and Song (2017) find that playing the insurance game increases 
uptake by about 9.1 percentage points. The simple provision of the probability 
information, however, performed significantly better (30 percentage points) than 
the insurance game. The results of this study seem to suggest that the description-
based training format has superior performance. 
 
Patt, Suarez, and Hess (2010) corroborated the findings of Cai and Song (2017). The 
study examined how traditional training sessions and role-playing games influence 
the understanding and decision of farmers in Ethiopia and Malawi in buying an index 
insurance product. The study finds that both mechanisms perform well and the role-
playing games do not necessarily outperform the traditional training sessions. A key 
result of the study is also that after both of the treatments, many farmers still had 
difficulty in understanding the basic concepts of the insurance.  
 
Gaurav, Cole, and Tobacman (2010) produced similar results for descriptive training 
methods while finding no effect for insurance games. The experimental study took 
place in Gujarat, India, and examined two key mechanisms of promoting rainfall 
insurance: two-day financial literacy training and insurance games. The financial 
training which also includes a 30-minute promotional video on index insurance is 
strongly linked with higher uptake of the index insurance. However, the insurance 
games did not show any statically significant effect on uptake.  
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Cole et al. (2013) results contradict the preceding positive effects of an educational 
video where they were not able to find any statistically important effect from similar 
sessions on insurance demand.  Cole et al. (2013) did their study in Andhra Pradesh 
India, but unlike Gaurav et al. (2010) their training video is much shorter than Cole et 
al. (2013).  
 
The empirical literature on the role of learning in insurance uptake is still largely 
scant.  Particularly, it is vital to understand the potentially differential performance 
of description- and experience-based training methods. The theoretical literature 
still is limited in establishing a stronger theoretical difference between the two 
choice formats for medium and large probabilities as discussed earlier. Yet, the stark 
difference for small probabilities makes the difference for medium and large 
probabilities quite a possibility.  
 
In this study, we investigate the effect of a simulated insurance game and a 9-min 
training video on the uptake of index insurance. The study uses a randomized 
experiment on 1743 pastoral households in the Samburu county in north Kenya.  The 
study investigates the effect of the two training methods on the uptake of an Index-
Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI), which provides insurance against drought that may 
lead livestock mortality in the study area.  
 
In the following four sections of this research paper, we will discuss data sources, 
empirical models and hypotheses, and finally results & discussion and conclusions, in 
the same order listed here.  
 
2. Explanation of data sources 
 
This study makes use of experimental data from the Samburu County (North Sub-
county) of Kenya. A research program that investigates two major treatment arms 
produced the experimental data. The first is IBLI, which is the focus of this study. The 
research program bundles this treatment with a second treatment, REAP Asset 
Transfer (or Graduation) Program. REAP stands for Rural Entrepreneur Access 
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Project. The overarching goal of the program is to see the impact of the two 
treatments on the welfare of the sampled households both separately and in a 
complementary manner. The scope of our study is limited only to the IBLI 
intervention.  
 
The experimental study focuses on two sub-populations:  (i) poor households who 
are eligible for the REAP program; and, (ii) vulnerable, non-poor households who are 
not eligible for REAP but who are just barely ineligible in terms of their asset 
endowment and living standards. The study area comprises of 7 mentor areas (for 
REAP) where a total of 66 communities are included.  From the selected 
communities, a total of 1743 households are randomly included in the study.  
 
A private insurance company has provided subsidized IBLI contracts in the study area 
since January 2018. A baseline survey took place in January 2018, followed by a 
midline in January 2020. The endline survey will be carried out in January 2022. The 
experimental data used for this study primarily relies on data from 6 sales windows 
that took place around Jan 2018; Aug 2018; Jan 2019; Aug 2019; Jan 2020 and Aug 
2020.  
The insurance game is a simulated interactive computer game. The subjects played 
the game on tablets. The game starts by allotting certain cash and livestock assets, 
both virtual. During the game, players decide whether to insure their livestock and 
how they invest resources in livestock or schooling. There are two versions of the 
game treatment based on how the insurance is framed. In the first case, the index 
insurance is presented as insurance for livestock loss. In the second version, the 
game presents the insurance in general as insurance for the livelihood of the 
household. Each of these two framings is applied to half of the treated households. 
The insurance game is assigned to sampled households using both random and 
convenience sampling techniques. At the first stage, some Manyattas were selected 
which are easier to be accessed by the researchers. In the second stage, households 
are randomly selected from the selected Manyattas.  
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The video treatment (9 min) was randomly assigned to half of the sampled 
households just before the fifth sales window (Jan 2020). Similarly to the game 
treatment, the insurance game is also presented to households in two framings, as 
insurance for household and as insurance for livestock. The videos use a narrative 
approach (in the local language) to communicate the benefits of IBLI and how it 
works. The videos make use of cartoons, relevant pictures, and maps in the video 
production.  
 
3. Hypotheses and empirical models  
 
This study tests two hypotheses: 
 
I. Computer-based simulation insurance games enhance the likelihood of 
the purchase of index insurance 
 
II. Informational and promotional video enhances the likelihood of the 
purchase of index insurance  
 
To test the preceding hypotheses, simple OLS regression models are fitted (Eq. 1): 
 
𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑖 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   (Eq. 1) 
 
Buyi is a binary variable for whether an individual i bought index insurance or not. 
For each treatment, Buyi refers to purchase after the treatment.  Since there are 
more than one sales windows after each treatment, separate regression models are 
run for different dependent variables defined for each sales window after the game 
treatment on a cumulative basis. For example, for the fourth sales windows, Buyi  is 
defined as purchases at and before the fourth sales window but after the treatment. 
Gamei indicates whether individual i received insurance game treatment or not. 
Similarly, we interpret Videoi for the video treatment. To account for the framings in 
the treatments, Gamei and  Videoi will be split based on whether the insurance is 
framed as insurance for household or insurance for livestock. Xi is a vector of   socio-
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4.1 Household characteristics 
 
An average sampled household has about 5 (4.7) members; see Table 1. This is 
somewhat higher than the average household size in Kenya (about 4). The higher 
household size is, however, expected for pastoral communities who often have 
larger households (Githinji, Otieno, Ackello-Ogutu, Mureithi, & Bostedt, 2019). Most 
of the interviewees are male households (about 70 percent) and the average age is 
46 years.  
 
Most of the respondents, about 84 percent, do not have any formal schooling. The 
average income of the sampled pastoral households is about 36,000 KES (330 USD) 
but with a relatively high standard deviation of about 59,000 (550 USD). Annual 
income as high as 892, 000 (8300 USD) is recorded. The same high heterogeneity is 
also observed for livestock ownership as shown in Table 1. Almost 29 percent of the 




4.2 Treatment and relation to insurance uptake-descriptive statistics 
 
Nearly half of the sampled households (51 percent) participated in the video 
treatment, see Table 1. The insurance game, however, is played by only 20 percent 
of the sample households. Figure 1 summarizes the descriptive relationship of the 
treatments to the uptake of insurance. Out of those who took the insurance game 
18.4 percent purchased the insurance at least once, compared to 17.9 in the control 
group. This supports the hypothesis that the game positively affects insurance 
uptake. For the video treatment, similar statistics suggests the opposite, contrary to 
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our expectation. Out of those treated with the video, about 5.7 percent purchased 
insurance compared to 6.7 in the control group.  
 
Figure 2 depicts the percent of buyers for each treatment across the six sales 
windows. Here, we can see that the insurance game is associated with higher 
percent of buyers. It reversed the relatively higher number of buyers in the control 
group prior to the game treatment just before the second sales window. The positive 
effect of the game appears to persist till the 4th sales window (Aug 2019) after which 
it is reversed. Figure 3 replicates the above diagram splitting the game treatment 
based on framing. The household framing suggests a stronger effect from the 
treatment than observed in Figure 2. For the livestock framing, however, there 
doesn’t appear to be any positive effect on uptake. In fact, the gap in the proportion 
of buyers between the control and treatment groups becomes wider after the game 
treatment with livestock framing. 
 
For the video treatment, the pre and post video uptake doesn’t show any important 
change. Repeating the same graph based on the framing used in the video treatment 
(Figure 4) also doesn’t show any important effect. 
 
4.3 Econometric models 
 
4.3.1 Insurance Game 
 
We ran regression models defining the dependent variable for each sales window 
based on cumulative sales after the game treatment. However, it is only uptake at 
the second sales window, right after the game treatment, that showed some 
association with the game treatment, see Table 2. The fourth column shows a 
positive association between game treatment and uptake at just 10 percent level of 
significance. Adding household size and schooling, however, reduced the significance 
just below 10 percent. These results could be taken as marginal evidence of the 
positive effect of the game treatment on uptake.  
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Table 3 shows the results when Table 2 is replicated by splitting the game treatment 
into two based on the framing of the index insurance as insurance for household and 
insurance for livestock. As it is evident in the table, the game treatment with 
household framing shows a consistent and positive effect on uptake at the second 
sales window, i.e. right after the game treatment. The effect is 3-4 percentage point 
(pp) increase in uptake. We are not able to find any significant effect for latter sales 
windows. In Table 2, even if column (5) indicates a smaller significance than column 
(4), it should be noted that the significance for game (household) is almost 5 percent 
(p value= 0.053). Presenting the insurance, as insurance for livestock doesn’t, 
however, seem to have any effect on uptake. In both Table 2 and 3, prepurchase and 
discount coupon showed significant effects. The negative sign for the former could 
be traced to the poorly implemented first sales window, based on subjective 
witnesses of researchers who took part in the survey. The most important factor 
that determines insurance demand is the discount coupon. Receiving a coupon 
increases the probability of buying an index insurance product by about 0.1. 
 
Figure 5 depicts the coefficients of the game treatment with household framing 
along the 95 percent confidence intervals for column (5) of Table 3. As it is evident in 
the figure, the coefficients show a slight decline after the second sales window (Aug 
2018) except the last window. This indicates that the effect from the games doesn’t 
persist for long. Furthermore, the confidence intervals consistently widen from the 
first to the last sales window further stressing the same observation.  
 
The OLS models showed no statistically significant relationship between insurance 
uptake and the video treatment when no interaction terms are included (Table 4). 
This holds for all sales windows after the treatment and despite splitting the video 
treatment into two based on framing. However, when we interact the two strongly 
significant variables, female and coupon, with the treatment variable, statistically 
significant variables emerge. Table 5 shows the results for the fourth sales window 
and for the fifth sales window the results remain more or less the same (Appendix 
1). It appears that the video treatment positively affects uptake for males, 2-3 pp 
increase in uptake. Yet for females the effect turned out to be negative, about 6 pp 
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decrease in uptake. A visual depiction of the result is provided in Figure 6. Applying 
the same type of analysis using interaction terms but splitting the video treatment 
into two based on framing also shows significant results. However, the results do not 
indicate differential impact as was the case for the game treatment, appendix 2. 
 
Significant results are also observed for the prepurchase variable, with or without 
the interaction. The prepurchase variable for the video treatment is defined in a 
different way from prepurchase in Table 3 & 4 for the game treatment. In addition to 
the first sales window, it includes the fourth sales window and all the preceding 
ones. The positive sign for it therefore indicates that pastorals that bought in any of 
the four sales windows before the fifth window are likely to purchase insurance. This 
is an indication that the quality of the service delivery has showed improvement 
after the first sales window, which was possibly ill executed as suggested by the 
results in Table 3 and4.   
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Our main finding is that both the 9-min video and the insurance game could 
positively affect uptake. The insurance game enhances the uptake of index insurance 
provided that the insurance is framed as insurance for household. The effect is 3-4 
percentage point (pp) increase in uptake. And it appears that the effect of the game 
is short-lived and only affects the uptake just right after the treatment. The effect of 
the video treatment depends on the gender of the treated household. For males, the 
effect is 2-3 pp increase in uptake while for females, the effect is about 6 pp 
decrease in uptake. The effect also persists up to a second sales window.  
 
The framing aspect of the study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first in the 
literature on the topic. It is possible that framing the insurance as insurance for the 
household may make it appear more useful than narrowly presenting it as insurance 
for the livestock. Besides, the IBLI is hardly an insurance product that insures 
livestock mortality as much as it insures against drought that affects a broader 
aspect of a household’s livelihood than just its livestock. The study’s finding on 
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framing has a crucial implication than transcends the topic of learning styles. It also 
indicates that the index insurance should be presented as insurance for the 
household in any form of communication whether in regular sales or in formal 
trainings.  
 
Some studies in the past have found similar results for experience-based or 
experiential games. For example, Cai and Song (2017) find that playing an insurance 
game increases uptake in a study area in China by about 9.1 percent. A study by 
Janzen et al. (2021) on smallholder farmers in Kenya also found a significant and 
positive effect in line with ours. Patt, Suarez, and Hess (2010) also documented a 
similar finding based on a study in Ethiopia and Malawi. In contrast to our finding, 
Gaurav et al. (2010) observed that an insurance game does not affect the uptake of 
an index insurance in Gujarat, India.  
 
Bearing in mind the particularly positive effect from more descriptive training 
methods in the literature, a strong positive effect for a video treatment is in general 
expected. Cai and Song (2017) found that a simple provision of probability 
information outperformed an insurance game by a higher margin in increasing 
insurance demand based on a study of disaster insurance in China. Similarly, Amh 
and Gaurav et al. (2010) were able to support the same line of argument where a 
training session did better than insurance game.  
 
In this study, however, the effect of the video treatment is somewhat less strong 
than the insurance game. The treatment has a conditional effect based on the 
gender of the learner, which could be even negative for females. One possible 
reason for this could be the design of the video that does not specifically and 
effectively address the expectations of female clients. A more concrete 
interpretation requires further study. A stronger effect from the insurance could be 
associated with the superior performance of interactive games, or gamification in 
general, in learning about index insurance. It is also possible that following the 
fourfold pattern (Harbaugh et al., 2010), descriptive choice format may induce risk 
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aversion assuming medium to large probabilities for the occurrence of gains from 
the insurance.   
 
Our result highlighted the crucial role played by subsidies and earlier purchases. A 
major review by Carter et al. (2017) underscored the importance of liquidity and 
subsidies in the uptake of index insurance. According to the review “take-up has 
been disappointingly low without large and sustained subsidies”. In line with this our 
coupon variables showed the strongest positive effect on uptake. The negative effect 
observed for prepurchase in the game treatment models also underscores the need 
for a cautious first time introduction of the product as this may have serious bearing 
on future sales. This is based on the subjective assessment of researchers who 
evaluated the quality of the index insurance delivery in the first sales window as 
inferior. 
 
Index insurance is a complex new product which has been introduced in the context 
of limited financial literacy. Index insurance is arguably more complex even 
compared to the regular insurance products people are familiar with because of its 
use of index rather than actual loss-valuation to make payouts. Furthermore, 
experiencing any benefit of the product may take several years unlike many other 
technologies. Yet, it seems that there is quite limited research on the learning aspect 
of the product. Even the basis risk problem of index insurance could be related to a 
lack of effective communication at the beginning of the diffusion of index insurancet 
which ic crucial to set the expectation of clients in the right way.  
 
Technology adoption in agriculture has demanded heavy investment in agricultural 
extension and communication infrastructures in the past. And for index insurance, 
the need for similar investment could be even more vital. The 9-min video or the 
insurance game that normally takes less than 30 min can be considered light 
interventions in view of the complexity of the product. It could be possibele to have 
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Figure 1. Percent of buyers by treatment 
 
  




Figure 3. Percent of buyers by game treatment and framing, for each sales window 
 
 




Figure 5. Coefficient estimate and CI for insurance game (household framing) for fifth 
column in Table 3. 
 
 



















Table 1 Summary statistics for explanatory variables 
Variable Mean SD Description 
Insurance uptake .289 .453 Dummy, 1 for purchasing insurance at least once, and 0 
otherwise 
Insurance Game .205 .404 Dummy, 1 for playing insurance game and 0, otherwise 
9-min video .511 .500 Dummy, 1 for taking video treatment and 0, otherwise 











Female .310 .463 Dummy, 1 if the household head is female, 0 otherwise 
Age 46.26 16.81 Age of the household head 
Schooling .163 .370 Dummy, 1 for any schooling and 0 otherwise 
Annual income 36,065 59,097 Annual income of the household 
Coupon .512 0.500 Dummy, 1 for receiving coupon for insurance purchase, 0 
otherwise 
Cattle ownership 2.66 3.34 Number of cattle owned by the household 
Camel ownership .424 1.15 Number of camels owned by the household 
Goat ownership 8.24 8.25 Number of goats owned by the household 
Sheep ownership 4.76 5.65 Number of sheep owned by the household 
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Table 2 Insurance uptake after GAME TREATMENT 
Dependent variable: 1 = Household bought index insurance at the 2nd sales window 
OLS estimate, with robust standard errors 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
      
Game 0.00244 0.00196 0.0168 0.0248* 0.0234 
 (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149) 
Prepurchase  -0.0487*** -0.00797 -0.0720*** -0.0721*** 
  (0.00925) (0.00891) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
Coupon    0.110*** 0.110*** 
    (0.0113) (0.0113) 
Female    0.00680 0.00808 
    (0.0110) (0.0112) 
HH size     0.000928 
     (0.00236) 
Schooling     0.0104 
     (0.0183) 
Manyatta fixed effect No No Yes Yes Yes 
   
Constant 0.0534*** 0.0618*** -0.00643 -0.0577*** -0.0633*** 
 (0.00605) (0.00692) (0.00698) (0.0129) (0.0185) 
      
Observations 1,743 1,743 1,737 1,735 1,734 




Table 3 Insurance uptake after GAME TREATMENT with framing 
Dependent variable: 1 = Household bought index insurance at the 2nd sales window 
OLS estimate, with robust standard error 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
      
Game (household) 0.00984 0.00918 0.0382* 0.0391** 0.0377* 
 (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0201) (0.0196) (0.0195) 
Game (Livestock) -0.00483 -0.00492 -0.00487 0.0103 0.00916 
 (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0212) (0.0210) (0.0210) 
Prepurchase  -0.0486*** -0.00787 -0.0716*** -0.0716*** 
  (0.00925) (0.00894) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
Coupon    0.109*** 0.109*** 
    (0.0113) (0.0113) 
Female    0.00686 0.00802 
    (0.0110) (0.0112) 
HH size     0.000828 
     (0.00236) 
Schooling     0.00999 
     (0.0182) 
Manyatta fixed effect No No Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant 0.0533*** 0.0616*** -0.00572 -0.0570*** -0.0620*** 
 (0.00604) (0.00691) (0.00740) (0.0129) (0.0185) 
      
Observations 1,743 1,743 1,737 1,735 1,734 






Table 4 Insurance uptake after VIDEO TREATMENT 
Dependent variable: 1 = Household bought index insurance at the 5th sales window 
OLS estimate, with robust standard error 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
      
Video -0.00649 -0.00590 -0.000726 -0.00323 -0.00302 
 (0.00993) (0.00970) (0.00964) (0.00945) (0.00947) 
Prepurchase  0.1000*** 0.109*** 0.0725*** 0.0730*** 
  (0.0152) (0.0160) (0.0172) (0.0172) 
Coupon    0.0551*** 0.0545*** 
    (0.00998) (0.0100) 
Female    0.0933*** 0.0960*** 
    (0.0134) (0.0138) 
HH size     0.00306 
     (0.00220) 
Schooling     -0.0196 
     (0.0138) 
Manyatta fixed effect No No Yes Yes Yes 
   
Constant 0.0481*** 0.0204*** 0.00753 -0.0230 -0.0384 
 (0.00733) (0.00650) (0.0286) (0.0298) (0.0352) 
      
Observations 1,743 1,743 1,737 1,735 1,734 
R-squared 0.000 0.047 0.098 0.149 0.151 
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Table 5 Insurance uptake after VIDEO TREATMENT, with interaction 
Dependent variable: 1 = Household bought index insurance at the 5th sales window 



























Robust standard errors in parentheses 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Video -0.00649 -0.00590 -0.000726 0.0224** 0.0235** 
 (0.00993) (0.00970) (0.00964) (0.00951) (0.00952) 
Prepurchase  0.1000*** 0.109*** 0.0735*** 0.0741*** 
  (0.0152) (0.0160) (0.0171) (0.0172) 
1.Coupon    0.0622*** 0.0619*** 
    (0.0145) (0.0146) 
1.Video#1.Coupon    -0.0153 -0.0158 
    (0.0187) (0.0187) 
Female    0.123*** 0.127*** 
    (0.0202) (0.0205) 
1.Video#1.Female    -0.0577** -0.0595** 
    (0.0266) (0.0265) 
HH size     0.00331 
     (0.00219) 
Schooling     -0.0204 
     (0.0137) 
Manyatta fixed effect No No Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 0.0481*** 0.0204*** 0.00753 -0.0351 -0.0522 
 (0.00733) (0.00650) (0.0286) (0.0300) (0.0352) 
      
Observations 1,743 1,743 1,737 1,735 1,734 








Insurance uptake after VIDEO TREATMENT, with interaction 
Dependent variable: 1 = Household bought index insurance at the 6th sales window 
OLS estimate, with robust standard error 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Video -0.00952 -0.00865 -0.00546 0.0255** 0.0268** 
 (0.0116) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0107) 
      
Prepurchase  0.148*** 0.162*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 
  (0.0177) (0.0185) (0.0193) (0.0193) 
      
Coupon    0.0815*** 0.0811*** 
    (0.0162) (0.0162) 
1.Video#1.Coupon    -0.0236 -0.0242 
    (0.0211) (0.0211) 
Female    0.173*** 0.178*** 
    (0.0223) (0.0226) 
1.video_all#1.Female    -0.0716** -0.0739** 
    (0.0297) (0.0295) 
HH size     0.00435* 
     (0.00252) 
Schooling     -0.0264* 
     (0.0151) 
Manyatta fixed effect No  No Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 0.0668*** 0.0258*** -0.00100 -0.0581* -0.0806** 
 (0.00855) (0.00724) (0.0289) (0.0307) (0.0364) 
      
Observations 1,743 1,743 1,737 1,735 1,734 










Insurance uptake after VIDEO TREATMENT, with interaction and framing 
Dependent variable: 1 = Household bought index insurance at the 5th sales window 












     
      
Video (household) -0.0185* -0.0165 -0.00865 0.0330** 0.0339** 
 (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0124) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
Video (livestock) 0.00527 0.00449 0.00669 0.0130 0.0143 
 (0.0129) (0.0125) (0.0143) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
Prepurchase  0.0996*** 0.109*** 0.0728*** 0.0733*** 
  (0.0151) (0.0160) (0.0171) (0.0171) 
 28 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 



















Insurance uptake after VIDEO TREATMENT, with interaction and framing 
Dependent variable: 1 = Household bought index insurance at the 6th sales window 
Coupon    0.0627*** 0.0624*** 
    (0.0145) (0.0145) 
1.Video (HH)#1.Coupon    -0.0378* -0.0382* 
    (0.0211) (0.0211) 
1.lVideo (Livestock)#1.Coupon    0.00539 0.00472 
    (0.0237) (0.0237) 
Female    0.122*** 0.127*** 
    (0.0203) (0.0206) 
1.Video (HH)#1.Female    -0.0747** -0.0761** 
    (0.0304) (0.0303) 
1.Video (Livestock)#1.Female    -0.0423 -0.0445 
    (0.0330) (0.0329) 
HH size     0.00346 
     (0.00220) 
Schooling     -0.0190 
     (0.0137) 
Manyatta fixed effect No No Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 0.0481*** 0.0205*** 0.00349 -0.0370 -0.0551 
 (0.00733) (0.00649) (0.0287) (0.0298) (0.0350) 
      
Observations 1,743 1,743 1,737 1,735 1,734 
R-squared 0.002 0.048 0.098 0.155 0.158 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
      
Video (household) -0.0168 -0.0139 -0.0169 0.0217 0.0229 
 (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0154) (0.0159) (0.0158) 
Video (livestock) -0.00238 -0.00353 0.00522 0.0290** 0.0305** 
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OLS estimate, with robust standard error 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 










 (0.0144) (0.0137) (0.0153) (0.0141) (0.0141) 
Prepurchase  0.148*** 0.162*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 
  (0.0177) (0.0185) (0.0193) (0.0193) 
Coupon    0.0818*** 0.0814*** 
    (0.0162) (0.0162) 
1.Video (HH)#1.Coupon    -0.0311 -0.0316 
    (0.0254) (0.0253) 
1.Video (livestock)#1.Coupon    -0.0168 -0.0176 
    (0.0258) (0.0257) 
1.Female    0.172*** 0.177*** 
    (0.0224) (0.0226) 
1.Video (HH)#1.Female    -0.0771** -0.0788** 
    (0.0360) (0.0356) 
1.lVideo (livestock)#1.Female    -0.0661* -0.0689* 
    (0.0356) (0.0354) 
HH size     0.00442* 
     (0.00252) 
Schooling     -0.0258* 
      
Manyatta fixed effect No No Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 0.0668*** 0.0258*** -0.00681 -0.0624** -0.0853** 
 (0.00856) (0.00723) (0.0290) (0.0306) (0.0364) 
      
Observations 1,743 1,743 1,737 1,735 1,734 
R-squared 0.001 0.076 0.132 0.213 0.216 
